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The focus of this thesis is The Spoils of Poynton 
(1896), by Henry James. What is at issue in the novel 
is a dispute over a houseful of rare furniture and ex­
pensive art-objects. The thesis explores the nature 
of this dispute by examining the human relations with 
the "things" which are the center of the conflict. 
The method of exploration is a literary theory of 
inference adapted from that suggested by Kenneth Burke. 
The method proceeds with an analysis of the novel on 
the basis of tracking down the recurrence of one term, 
"thing(s)," throughout the novel, and with the build­
ing of an interpretation based upon the meaning, equa­
tions, and implications which emerge from the appear­
ance and transformation of that one term. 
The meaning of the term "thing" is explored from 
a phenomenological point of view. The thesis upholds 
the view that material "things," or objects, have an 
independent reality and power of presencing that is 
necessary to, and shared by, but not created by, human 
consciousness. Human beings exist in a necessary re­
lation to the "things" that constiture the world. 
The problems that human beings have with each other 
are directly related to the problems we have living in 
harmony with the "things" around us. 
One of the important implications that emerges from 
the novel's story of a dispute over "things" is the 
problem of desire. It can be shown that the novel 
phenomenologically reveals the problem with "things" 
in three important aspects of human desire: avidity, 
idolatry, and sexuality. The factor of imperialism is 
also interwoven with these three aspects. 
The thesis also holds that, through this method of 
interpretation, James's artistic and moral vision can 
be shown to be not only passionately attentive to the 
particulars of human existence but dedicated to a whole 
and unifying vision that addresses the sources of 
human suffering and seeks to restore the moral unity 
that is lacking in our relations with one another and 
with our world. 
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And the unseen eyebeam crossed, for the roses 
Had the look of flowers that are looked at. 
T. S. Eliot 
That is why so many painters have said that 
things look at them. 
Merleau-Ponty 
v 
Introduction 
'"All that bother about a houseful of furniture,"' 
R.P. Blackmur remarks, "is the shining indifferent re­
sponse to The Spoils of Poynton, where a more interested 
response would have been to exclaim 'What an extraor­
dinary quality of human value Henry James managed to 
focus in a houseful of furniture!"'* 
It was that quality, the relations between people 
and things, that arrested me in my first reading of the 
novel. The story itself is simple enough on its sur­
face, but the telling of that story makes it a remarkable 
work of art. The particular key to the novel's artistic 
success, that I stumbled upon and that began to fairly 
leap from every page, was the phenomenological appearance 
of "things." 
The Spoils of Poynton is fundamentally about "things." 
But that proposition becomes more complex once we inquire 
into the nature and meaning of "things." I have since 
found that to discover the meaning of "things" is to 
approach the meaning of The Spoils, and, conversely, the 
novel can be seen as an exploration into the meaning of 
"things." 
It is the household objects which provide the "bone 
of contention," the center of the dispute, which is the 
agency of the novel's drama. These objects, enshrined 
1 
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in the magnificent house called Poynton, are often re­
ferred to in the narration and dialogue as "things." 
Curiously, one begins to notice that many other things 
are referred to by the same term, and the suspicion arises 
that "things" are rather deliberately confused with other 
possible "things." 
The main agents of the drama, Mrs. Gereth and Fleda 
Vetch, befriend one another on the basis of a shared 
appreciation of beautiful things, which is also, in the 
first scene, a shared dismay at the ugliness of the things 
around them at Waterbath. The mistress of this dreadful 
place is Mona Brigstock, who, Mrs. Gereth fears, will be­
come engaged to her son, Owen. This is indeed what happens 
once Mona has seen Poynton, which Owen has recently inher­
ited. Mrs. Gereth is frantic about the imagined fate of 
her rare collection of things, once they are in the hands 
of a Philistine like Mona. She acts on her fears, makes 
Fleda (who secretly loves Owen) her ally, and the battle 
over things has begun. 
As in any similar family dispute, the characters 
involved become downright ugly, even sinister, in their 
respective, socially-acceptable ways of abusing and tor­
menting one another. Only Fleda remains free of such 
sordid behavior, although she comes close to becoming 
victimized by the attitudes and actions of the other 
characters. The motivation and objective of these actions 
3 
are the things which are the center of the story. 
Because of the commonplace nature of the word "thing" 
in ordinary usage, it often passes our notice in fictional 
works. It is not the kind of word that draws attention 
to itself, or that one would trouble to ponder, as it 
usually disguises itself in its context. It is a very 
strange word. 
Frequent repetition of the term may serve to bridge 
various contexts by its appearance in each of them. This 
is what seems to happen with "things" in The Spoils. In 
general, the term can be (synchronically) an abstraction, 
a transparency through which its context is visible (as 
in "the thing we talked about yesterday"). But it can 
also become, through frequent repetition, (diachronically) 
concrete. That is, through repetition in different con­
texts the term gains an opacity that does not reflect its 
immediate context but allows it to reflect the larger con­
text created by its own multiplicity. 
In the novel what seems amusing at first, but more 
serious later, is that the term also functions as a pun. 
The word primarily refers to the household objects, but it 
also refers to many other kinds of things, and the occasion­
al confusion of referents provides for some humorous and 
some thought-provoking questions as to what may be meant 
by such an implicit, or explicit, pun. 
Furthermore, the word is gradually transformed from 
4 
its empirical reference to other less tangible meanings 
and equations. What are the implications that arise from 
a fusion of "things" in themselves with "things" we do, 
"things" we say, or feel, and "things" which are important 
and not easily articulated? 
The Spoils of Poynton can be seen to be constructed 
on the repetition, equations, transformations, and impli­
cations of the word "thing." In my attempt to form a 
coherent interpretation based on what I saw as James's in­
tentional "logic" of "things," I found one of Kenneth 
Burke's suggested methods of literary criticism to be not 
only helpful, but necessary in my endeavor. No other 
critical view is as appropriate for the inferential 
approach which the novel demands. 
Burke's method is that of an analysis of a work of 
art with regard to particular terms, and a tracking-down 
of those terms in the text. Both the "internality amongst 
those terms,"" and their implications extending beyond the 
text to the realm of shared human experience, allow for a 
critical interpretation that may be philosophical and 
social as well as literary. 
Burke summarizes his method as (in part) an attempt 
"to sketch a technique for the analysis of a work in its 
q 
nature as a structure of organically-interrelated terms." 
He says this method is "somewhat phenomenological in aim, 
seeking to get at the psychological depth of a work through 
5 
the sheer comparison of its surfaces.The tracking-
down of a term, including its equations and transfor­
mations, allows us to unearth the deeper implications of 
the whole work. Since Henry James was very much con­
cerned with matters of art and human actions, and since 
his aesthetic can be shown to be essentially phenomeno-
logical, I have found the application of Burke's method 
to be compatible, complementary, and illuminating with 
regard to the art of Henry James. 
I have also appealed to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
and Santayana for their philosophical understanding of 
the particular human situation that James depicts and 
dramatizes in the novel. I have tried to weave these 
philosophical and aesthetic views together in such a way 
that does not belie their respective differences, or im­
pose upon James's inherent refinement and subtlety. 
Instead, I have tried to combine these shared concerns 
for a better understanding of the necessary and peculiar 
relations between people and things. 
I don't claim to have resolved any overwhelming 
questions about the nature of things. But I think it can 
be shown, in this approach to understanding Henry James's 
artistic and moral vision, that The Spoils of Poynton 
speaks to our existential plight as creatures of desire, 
and appeals to our appreciation of the importance and 
meaning of "things"—the objects of Our desire. 
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My first chapter begins with a discussion of "things" 
as they are presented in the novel and in the Preface to 
the New York Edition.® James's own critical commentary 
on the novel is important to our concern here for the 
light it casts upon the necessarily noumenal quality of 
the Things themselves—a quality which is sustained through­
out the work and essential to the ending.* 
Partly because of this quality, the Things them­
selves become translated and transformed into other 
equations. I show in the second and third chapters how 
this development is generated by the term "thing," and 
why this development is central to the whole work. I 
show this by shifting back and forth between the "inter-
nality" of the term's relations in the text, and the im­
plications which emerge from the metaphorical world of the 
novel to touch and intersect with the larger world of 
human experience. 
* 
The Dictionary of Philosophy defines noumenon as: 
"literally, thing known by the mind as against the senses. 
Kant's alternative term for a thing-in-itself, which we 
could never be acquainted with, or even in any way know 
what it was like. But Kant thought that noumena must be 
postulated, to account for the appearances (phenomena) we 
are confronted with."6 
Although the Things in the novel can be and are ex­
perienced, James creates an ambiguity as to whether it is 
the objects themselves which are "experienced," or, rather, 
if it is what the Things mean to the people concerned with 
them that is experienced. This psychological insight on 
James's part is absolutely essential to the novel's 
dramatic development. 
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Chapter four addresses James1s technique in The Spoils 
(and more generally) with particular focus on the formal 
success of the novel, and how this formal completeness is 
a moral completeness. The conclusion wraps things up, re­
turning to the premise that is fundamental to the novel, 
and to the world of things we take for granted: we live 
in necessary relation with the things around us, and 
problems of human desire are problems of the objects of 
desire. 
Chapter One 
The Things Themselves 
First we must look closely at the Things themselves 
as they figure in the novel. The most obvious point to be 
made initially is that without them there would be no 
novel. There is a continuous tension created by, on the 
one hand, the noumenal quality of the real objects, and 
on the other hand the powerful agency of these mysterious 
Things which initiate and prompt every human act, relation­
ship, speech, and consequence. Their "role" as agents in 
the drama is objectively underplayed and affectively overt. 
They are not realistically described, but they are certain­
ly real in the part they play and in the passions they 
arouse. 
In his Preface, James recounts the problems he had 
in presenting (he doesn't say "representing") the Things 
themselves. What he wanted to do with them, for them, he 
was prevented from successfully doing (he claims). However, 
the more he speaks of what he "would have" done, the more 
we may be tempted to believe this is in fact what he did 
finally do. 
On the face of it the "things" themselves would 
form the very centre of such a crisis; these 
grouped objects, all conscious of their eminence 
and their price, would enjoy, in any picture of 
a conflict, the heroic importance. They would 
have to be presented, they would have to be 
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painted—arduous and desperate thought; some­
thing would have to be done for them not too 
ignobly unlike the great array in which Balzac, 
say, would have marshalled them: that amount 
of workable interest at least would evidently 
be "in it." 
(Preface, p.ix) 
Although language is capable of presenting things that 
painting cannot, the reverse is also true. Cezanne's 
paintings, for example, bear this out; he succeeded in the 
very place that James claims here to have been thwarted. 
Cezanne's apples have that look of almost knowing they are 
looked at; James sought to present the Things—as Things 
that know they are felt—without having to explain their 
agency. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: "Only the painter is 
entitled to look at everything without being obliged to 
»7 
appraise what he sees."' 
James needed, for the novel, a human consciousness to 
perform the function of understanding that belongs to ar­
tistic language—to appreciate, to appraise, to interpret 
the "things" and "the power in them that one had from the 
first appreciated" (Preface, p.xiii). He explains how 
Fleda's consciousness came to replace that of the Things: 
For something like Fleda Vetch had surely been 
latent in one's first apprehension of the theme; 
it wanted, for treatment, a centre, and, the 
most obvious centre being "barred," this image, 
while I still wondered, had, with all the assur­
ance in the world, sprung up in its place. The 
real centre, as I say, the citadel of the inter­
est, with the fight waged around it, would have 
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been the felt beauty and value of the prize of 
battle, the Things, always the splendid Things, 
placed in the middle light, figured and consti­
tuted, with each identity made vivid, each char­
acter discriminated, and their common conscious­
ness of their great dramatic part established. 
(Preface, p. xii) 
James implies that to have presented the Things as con­
scious would have required "dialogue" (p. xii), and the 
danger in this would have been to cheapen them by animat­
ing or personifying them. 
The spoils of Poynton were not directly arti­
culate, and though they might have, and con­
stantly did have, wondrous things to say, their 
message fostered about them a certain hush of 
cheaper sound—as a consequence of which, in 
fine, they would have been costly to keep up. 
(Preface, p. xii) 
Fleda, he tells us, was "maintainable at less ex­
pense" (xii), but the bargain he struck was a technical 
necessity, not really a choice. If the Things themselves 
have the capacity to motivate human actions, then how was 
he to convey this? He was forced to characterize the 
Things through their being perceived. They could not 
otherwise be presented without their appearing to be 
something they were not, or could not be. Instead of 
having them appear autonomously, they would have to appear 
as they were apprehended by the other characters. Artis­
tically, this seemed to James to be a compromise, but 
philosophically, the process through which the Things 
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appear in the novel is in keeping with the reality of how 
Things appear to people, what Things mean to people, and 
what Things do to people. 
Yes, it is a story of cabinets and chairs and 
tables; they formed the bone of contention, but 
what would merely "become" of them, magnificent­
ly passive, seemed to represent a comparatively 
vulgar issue. The passions, the faculties, 
the forces their beauty would, like that of 
Helen of Troy, set in motion, was what, as a 
painter, one had really wanted of them, was the 
power in them that one had from the first 
appreciated. 
(Preface, p. xiii) 
Comparing the power of the Things to Helen of Troy is a 
cryptic but highly suggestive way to emphasize the agency 
of the Things. (I will return to this image in Chapter 
Three.) James is pointing out, here in the Preface, that 
the human drama of the novel is not independent of the 
objects of that conflict. The bonding that exists between 
the Things and the human characters is a bonding that 
depends as much on the one side as on the other. This re­
ciprocity between Things and people corresponds very real­
istically to how we, in fact, exist in the world. But more 
of that later. 
Although James may not have succeeded in "painting" 
the Things as he would have done, he managed to convey 
them, albeit nonconspicuously, as animated and animating, 
as characters not living but alive in the drama of the 
novel. In the final chapter, the tragedy could be said to 
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be their tragedy, and it is in their smoke that Fleda 
finds herself, as she had once found herself in the splen­
dor, the "gleam," of their "general glittering presence" 
(Preface, p. xii). The conviction of their central and 
powerful agency in the novel, and their reciprocal relat­
ion with the mortals around them, is further affirmed by 
this haunting statement in the Preface: 
The "things" are radiant, shedding afar, with 
a merciless monotony, all their light, exerting 
their ravage without remorse; and Fleda almost 
demonically both sees and feels, while the 
others but feel without seeing. 
(p. xv) 
One of the primary ways in which James established 
the bonding between Things and people is the way in which 
he extended the transforming presence of things by 
punning on the word "things." The repeated occurrence of 
the word "thing(s)" comes to bear a far greater weight of 
significance (in the unfolding drama itself) than a mere 
pun. The network of the term's appearance can be seen 
to be—to use one of James' metaphors—the very string that 
his pearls are strung on. 
The first overt clue to the mileage James will gain 
from the word is found at the ending of the first chapter 
and the beginning of the second. Fleda is in transit from 
Waterbath to London, "and as she came up to town on the 
Monday what she stared at from the train in the suburban 
13 
fields was a future full of the things she particularly 
loved" (p. 11). Chapter Two immediately resumes with: 
"These were neither more nor less than the things with 
which she had had time to learn from Mrs. Gereth that 
Poynton overflowed" (p. 12). 
The fact that this first overt equation of "things" 
with the Things occurs precisely at a shift in scene, is 
an example of what Kenneth Burke calls the "Scene-Act 
Ratio." Burke says: "It is a principle of drama that the 
nature of acts and agents should be consistent with the 
Q 
nature of the scene." James's theatrical experiments, 
which ended immediately before the writing of The Spoils, 
may have contributed to the structural consistency we find 
in the novel, insofar as the agency of the Things corres­
ponds to the scenic changes and the actions of the charac­
ters. The correspondence is a causal one, in that the 
dramatic action of the characters always follows the 
appearance or movement of the Things—or, at least some 
* 
concern with them. 
Even the first scene, which is Waterbath, is 
developed by the conspicuous absence of the Things at 
* One example of such correspondence is pointed out 
overtly from within the text itself, when Fleda remarks 
ironically of Mona: "From the moment the house was once 
more what it had to be her natural charm reasserted itself" 
(p. 255). 
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Poynton—an absence that colors Waterbath in negative 
tones and announces in advance (and thus enhances) the 
g 
beauty of Poynton's Things by contrast. It is in this 
scene that the meeting of Mrs. Gereth and Fleda (and all 
the principal characters, sans Things) becomes possible. 
It is out of absence that Fleda and Mrs. Gereth are thrown 
together, but although we are told that Fleda "was in her 
small way a spirit of the same family as Mrs. Gereth" 
(p. 11), we find later that their respective sources of 
suffering the "aesthetic misery" of Waterbath are actually 
quite different. 
Fleda, who appreciates beautiful things, and Mrs. 
Gereth who possesses and is attached to her own fine things, 
are united by their mutual dismay at Waterbath. "The 
house was perversely full of souvenirs of places even more 
ugly than itself and of things it would have been a pious 
duty to forget" (p. 7). The notion of piety applied to 
forgetting the "things" at Waterbath will be reversed in 
the piety bestowed upon the Things at Poynton, There, 
Fleda will learn that for Mrs. Gereth "the piety most real 
to her was to be on one's knees before one's high standard" 
(p. 30). Santayana's definition of piety is pertinent here: 
"Piety, in its nobler and Roman sense, may be said to mean 
man's reverent attachment to the sources of his being and 
the steadying of his life by that attachment."-^ We will 
15 
come to see how Mrs. Gereth's "piety" is what Santayana 
describes as a "piratical or desperate venture" as 
opposed to a "sacred mission." 
Fleda's aversion to ugliness is seized upon by 
Mrs. Gereth at Waterbath, as her reverence for beauty will 
be seized upon at Poynton. We can thus see how important 
are the objects of desire or repugnance to the imperious 
drama played out between the two principal characters of 
the novel. There is disparity between what the Things 
really are and how they are perceived—a disparity which 
provides for the crisis in which all the characters become 
entangled, in which Fleda becomes victimized, and for 
which Mrs. Gereth is primarily responsible. 
The reader is forewarned from the beginning of Mrs. 
Gereth's tendency to overrule reality with her own ideas 
and plans. In the first scene we are told that she has 
"clutched at the idea that something might be done with 
the girl before her" (p. 8). Once the scene has shifted 
to Poynton, Fleda perceives that Mrs. Gereth's "passion" 
was "not the crude love of possession; it was the need to 
be faithful to a trust and loyal to an idea" (p. 46). 
The situation develops into something more serious; when 
Fleda objects to being "shown off" to Owen, "Mrs. Gereth 
was secretly surprised at her not being as happy to be 
sacrificed to the supremacy of a high standard as she was 
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to sacrifice her" (p. 37). 
As the drama unfolds in the presence of the magni­
ficent Things, they seem to diminish, in their actual 
value, in light of Mrs. Gereth's "high standard" and 
ideas, as they gain value, proportionately, in Fleda's 
estimation and appreciation of them. The power of the 
Things works madness on one and devotion on the other. 
The tension between Mrs. Gereth's distorted ideas 
and the Things themselves is developed into the "eternal 
vicious circle" to which all the characters (Things in­
cluded) become "condemned" (p. 57). Through the strange 
"accidental" mixture of Owen's legal and hymeneal rights, 
and Mrs. Gereth's obsession (all of which rests on the 
necessary presence of the Things), the situation becomes 
hopelessly binding on all concerned. Mrs. Gereth, partly 
because of her own obstinacy, is forced to select only 
certain Things. There are existential implications to be 
read into her "dilemma," which is described as "the odious-
ness of sacrificing the exquisite things one wouldn't 
take to the exquisite things one would, This immediately 
made the things one wouldn't the very things one ought 
to ..." (p. 57). 
The passages that follow suggest that the Things them­
selves are imperiled by Mrs. Gereth's standards of "piety," 
The narrative describes their "faces of supplication," 
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"these faces, so conscious of their race and their danger" 
(p. 57). There is then a glimpse of their actual beauty— 
translated immediately, however, by what Mrs. Gereth sees 
in them (i.e., herself): 
The shimmer of wrought substances spent itself 
in the brightness; the old golds and brasses, 
old ivories and bronzes, the fresh old tapes­
tries and deep old damasks threw out a radiance 
in which the poor woman saw in solution all her 
old tricks and triumphs. 
(p. 58) 
The Things in the novel can never be seen for what 
they are in themselves; they are always translated by 
someone's appreciation or experience of them. The psycho­
logical truth of this phenomenon makes it clear that things 
are not as they appear, and that the reality of Things in 
themselves is subordinate to the human means by which they 
are treated and regarded. It is this situation which is 
the scene of all the unhappiness in the novel. 
The Things may have been collected and possessed by 
Mrs. Gereth, but they are not safe with her. The reader 
is alerted to this fact in the first Poynton scene, that 
although they're "living things to me; they know me, they 
return the touch of my hand," Mrs. Gereth's passion lies 
somewhere outside of them: 
There's a care they want, there's a sympathy 
that draws out their beauty. Rather than make 
them over to a woman ignorant and vulgar I think 
18 
I'd deface them with my own hands 
(p. 31) 
This completely contradictory testimony is self-incrimi­
nating evidence which discredits her alleged concern for 
the Things. Furthermore, her speech to Owen only alienates 
him from her—not only does she denounce his beloved as 
"ignorant and vulgar," she goes on to prove what a negli­
gible position Owen holds in the pantheon of things that 
are dear to her: 
"The best things here, as you know, are the 
things your father and I collected, things all 
that we worked for and waited for and suffered 
for. Yes...there are things in the house that 
we almost starved for! They were our religion, 
they were our life, they were us! And now 
they're only me ..." 
(pp. 30-31) 
This parody of cliched parental resentment permutates the 
reference of the word "things" to a debased domain. 
The mystery surrounding the real Things can be seen 
as consistent with the mystery surrounding the motives 
and behavior of the characters. If things are, as Kant 
proposed, unknowable in themselves and only objects of 
human design and desire, then what are we to make of Mrs. 
Gereth's confession of identity with them? The subtlety 
of James' equation of people and things captures and dis­
closes an experiential problem of human desires and actions. 
If there is this ambiguity in the objects of desire, does 
19 
this not reflect upon the ambiguity of the characters' 
motives and their relations with one another? 
At this point we can depart from the Things them­
selves to discuss other equations of the word "thing," 
which will place things in the larger context of their 
implications. 
Chapter Two 
Things and Their Equations 
In a passage that precedes the "eternal vicious 
circle" of having to choose the "things" one would take or 
leave behind, we are told that Fleda's sense of the "dread­
ful move" to Ricks was that she "had an imagination of 
drama, of a 'great scene,' a thing, somehow, of indignity 
and misery..." (p. 56). We can see here, as we will see 
frequently in the novel, an equation of the word "thing" 
with some kind of "great scene," or affair, or "matter." 
The dispute over the Things is itself a "thing," as in 
"the whole wretched thing" (p. 162), and human actions are 
"things," as in the sense that Owen "was doing things" 
that cause his mother so much torment (p. 59). When Mrs. 
Brigstock says to Fleda, "'There are things that have 
brought me here,'" "'They can't be things of any import­
ance,' Owen, to Fleda's surprise, suddenly asserted" 
(p. 175). 
These equations are worthy of serious reflection, 
especially if we take into account the etymological meaning 
of the word "thing." Martin Heidegger tells us: 
... the Old High German word thing means a 
gathering, and specifically a gathering to 
deliberate on a matter under discussion, a con­
tested matter. In consequence, the Old German 
20 
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words thing and dine become the names for an 
affair or matter of pertinence. They denote 
anything that in any way bears upon men, concerns 
them, and that accordingly is a matter for dis­
course . 11 
We have seen how Mrs. Gereth's "high standard" or 
"idea" signals a disparity in how she perceives Things 
and how they really are; this disparity is also at work 
in her manner of distancing herself from the "matter" at 
hand—a matter in which she has played a great part in 
creating. This in turn means she becomes alienated from 
the people around her. The problem with the Things them­
selves and with "things in general" is thus shown to be, 
on the one hand, a problem of perception—an aesthetic 
problem; and on the other hand it is shown to be a problem 
of nearness and distance, which becomes a moral problem. 
Mrs. Gereth's particular form of aestheticism means 
that she must be near her Things. Yet, as we have seen, 
she is no closer to them than she is to Owen. The moral 
consequence of her kind of "nearness" is, in Heidegger's 
words, "the fact that despite all conquest of distances 
the nearness of things remains absent. Heidegger devel­
ops this problem as one of how we live alienated from 
"things" because of our teleological presuppositions re­
garding them. He contradicts the Kantian view of things as 
mere objects of human use, by pointing out the necessity 
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of a rapport with things: 
Indeed, the loss of rapport with things that 
occurs in states of depression would be wholly 
impossible if even such a state were not still 
what is as a human state: that is, a staying 
with things. Only if this stay already charac­
terizes human being can the things among which 
we are also fail to speak to us, fail to con­
cern us any longer.^ 
We can perhaps begin now to see the larger signifi­
cance of the novel—it is, really, about how we exist only 
more or less in relation to the "things amongst which we 
are." Both aesthetic and moral problematics are mistaken 
by the characters in the novel as static relations, where­
as in fact, as James shows us, they are dynamic relations 
which are interwoven and which constitute our reality. 
The Things in the novel function as a priori relata 
of human relations, and they provide the fundamental 
£ 
"scene" in which all the human drama is enacted. The 
relation between the presence of the Things in the novel 
(even before we see or know of them) and the human actions 
inspired by them, is a necessary relation that we are apt 
* By "scene" here I mean more than the dramatic setting. 
The "scene" provided by the Things is more than a literal 
representation of their presence; it is, rather, a dynamic 
scene of the power of the Things to arouse and incite human 
actions and relationships. The characters are apparently 
unaware—to their misfortune^—of the moral and social im­
plications arising from their relations with and amidst 
these household objects. 
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to take for granted in the novel as we take it for granted 
in our world. Henry James is not the kind of artist to 
let us take things for granted. 
Mrs. Gereth's estrangement from Owen, and consequent­
ly her dispossession of Poynton, her home, is dependent 
upon the priority of her "high standard," which paradoxi­
cally has estranged her from the very objects of that 
standard: the Things themselves. It doesn't really matter 
what they are; what matters is how they are regarded. No 
wonder Fleda thinks at one point that "it would have been 
better never to have had such a place than to have had it 
and lose it" (p. 44). Her sympathy for Mrs. Gereth begins 
to wane when she tries to discern what has gone awry in 
the situation: 
... what a strange relation between mother and 
son when there was no fundamental tenderness 
out of which a solution would irrepressibly 
spring! Was it Owen who was mainly responsible 
for that poverty? Fleda couldn't think so when 
she remembered that, so far as he was concerned, 
Mrs. Gereth would still have been welcome to 
keep her seat by the Poynton fire. 
(p. 44) 
The more Mrs. Gereth insists on her proximity to the Things, 
the further she is removed. 
The paradox of conflicting subjective and objective 
values is primarily characterized by Mrs. Gereth in its 
worst manifestation, but Fleda suffers from a similar 
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paradox which sets her equally at odds with the world 
around her: Fleda's problem is that she loves beauty. If 
Fleda is difficult for us to understand (as the critical 
debate over her testifies), she is herself confounded by 
14 her own understanding of things. What does the love of 
beauty entail, in a world of inverted values? Furthermore, 
what is beauty? What is love? Such large questions de­
ceptively arise from the dispute over rare household 
furniture. 
I mentioned before that in the action of the novel 
the moving of the Things is inseparable from the shifting 
of the drama—the latter contingent upon the former. The 
correspondence is also expressed in the shift in termin­
ology that occurs when the Things have been moved from 
Poynton to Ricks: the word "spoils" makes its first appear­
ance, and the Things hereafter are referred to as such. 
The change of the nominative has its behavioral complement, 
as in: "What indeed was her spoliation of Poynton but the 
first engagement of a campaign?" (p. 78). There is an echo 
here of an earlier appearance of the verb in a different 
"case": "The truth was simply that all Mrs. Gereth's 
scruples were on one side and that her ruling passion had 
in a manner despoiled her of her humanity" (p. 37). Her 
humanity had been despoiled, and so had the Things. 
There is enough evidence in the novel to suggest that, 
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for Mrs. Gereth, the Things were never anything but 
spoils, from other countries, other times. The fact that 
James changed the original title, The Old Things, to 
The Spoils, is pertinent in this regard.^-® It is in Fleda 
that the spoliation is felt most keenly, as we learn in 
her first sleepless night at Ricks, with the transplanted 
Things around her: 
She couldn't care for such things when they 
came to her in such ways; there was a wrong 
about them all that turned them to ugliness. 
In the watches of the night she saw Poynton 
dishonoured; she had cherished it as a happy 
whole, she reasoned, and the parts of it now 
around her seemed to suffer like chopped limbs. 
To lie there in the stillness was partly to 
listen for some soft low plaint from them. 
(p. 78) 
Again, the factor of scene is very important: Poynton 
was a whole, greater than the sum of its parts. Crammed 
into Ricks, the Things have the ambience of being "stolen;" 
the aesthetic proportions of the scene reflect the moral 
proportions. 
Fleda tried to think of some of the things at 
Poynton still unappropriated, but her memory 
was a blank about them, and in the effort to 
focus the old combinations she saw again nothing 
but gaps and scars, a vacancy that gathered at 
moments into something worse. 
(p. 79) 
The "something worse" is of course the existential 
(and ultimately cosmic) implications that spiral outwards, 
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entangling and altering the relationships between people, 
and between people and the world around them.* Santayana, 
in speaking of the symbols and objects of human piety, 
16 
says that things are the "foci of communal life." What 
happens in the novel is that these objects of household 
piety become the foci of a distorted, antagonistic communal 
life. 
Regarding the more cosmic implications, Heidegger 
argues that the way we "preserve" the "fourfold" of our 
existence—earth, sky, divinity, mortals—is in "dwelling." 
How do mortals make their dwelling such a pre­
serving? Mortals would never be capable of it 
if dwelling were merely a staying on earth, under 
the sky, before the divinities, among mortals. 
Rather, dwelling, as preserving, keeps the four­
fold in that with which mortals stay: in things 
... But things themselves secure the fourfold 
only when they themselves as things are let be 
in their presencing. 
For Fleda, it is this loss of presencing that is felt in 
j|( sfc 
the spoliation of Poynton. 
* It never seems to occur to Fleda that Poynton itself 
is a version of spoliation on a grander scale, as implied 
by the title of the novel. 
** This is what Fleda's "imagination of disaster" correct­
ly intuits on three important occasions in the novel: at 
Poynton (p. 56), at Ricks (above, p. 79), and in the train 
at the end of the novel (p. 262). 
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The ramifications of displacement, homelessness, and 
disproportion emerge from the distorted relations between 
people and things. In the end, Fleda is more homeless 
than at the beginning; Mrs. Gereth is displaced, dis­
possessed; the Things are stolen, and then returned only 
to be destroyed. Owen and Mona, too, at the end are in 
a kind of exile from "home." 
The narrative also brings up other social factors 
related to the problem of "dwelling." For example, there 
is "the cruel English custom of the expropriation of the 
lonely mother" (p. 15), but Mrs. Gereth uses this factor 
to gain Fleda's sympathy (also on page 49). When Fleda 
suggests the idea of a common household as a "graceful 
compromise," 
Mrs. Gereth hailed this question with a wan 
compassionate smile: she replied that a common 
household was in such a case just so inconceiv­
able that Fleda had only to glance over the fair 
face of the English land to see how few people 
had ever conceived it. It was always thought a 
wonder, a "mistake," a piece of overstrained 
sentiment; and she confessed she was as little 
capable of a flight of that sort as Owen himself. 
(p. 18) 
There is double-edged criticism here: of English customs 
and attitudes, and of Mrs. Gereth's easy adaptation of 
them for her argument. "Fleda's breath was sometimes taken 
away by the great fierce bounds and elisions which, on 
Mrs. Gereth's lips, the course of discussion could take" 
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(p. 18). 
The social factors thus appear to be a consequence, 
not a cause, of the displacement or homelessness that 
occurs because of our inability to "stay with things." 
The agency of the Things in the novel reflects the agency 
of the "things" amongst which we have our human being. 
Things constitute our world. 
"Things" were of course the sum of the world; 
only, for Mrs. Gereth, the sum of the world was 
rare French furniture and oriental china. 
(P. 24) 
In the Preface, James speaks very directly of this 
disjunctive human condition as embodied by Mrs. Gereth: 
One thing was "in it," in the sordid situation, 
on the first blush, and one thing only—though 
this, in its limited way, no doubt, a curious 
enough value: the sharp light it might project 
on that most modern of our current passions, the 
fierce appetite for the upholsterer's and the 
joiner's and brazier's work, the chairs and 
tables, the cabinets and presses, the material 
odds and ends, of the more labouring ages. A 
lively mark of our manners indeed the diffusion 
of this curiosity and this avidity, and full of 
suggestion, clearly, as to their possible in­
fluence on other passions and other relations. 
(p- ix) 
Let us then consider more specifically some of these 
"other passions and other relations" in the reflected 
light of the Things and their equations. 
First, the necessary condition of spatial relations 
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is an a priori "given" which the artist makes explicit 
in confronting our habits of taking it for granted. Human 
social relations rely upon this condition, emprirically 
and psychologically. As I mentioned before, Heidegger 
finds the problems in human relations to be fundamentally 
spatial problems—of nearness and distance—literally and 
metaphorically. 
We have looked at Mrs. Gereth's alienation as arising, 
at least in part, from the disjunction between her "stand­
ards" and the real Things, and we have looked at the con­
sequences of that disjunction as dramatized scenically 
(spatially)—resulting finally in a quite literal alien­
ation from her home, as well as from other people. As 
Heidegger says, the necessary relations of "nearness and 
remoteness between men and things can become mere distance, 
18 
mere intervals of intervening space." Metaphorically 
and literally Fleda ends up wandering in the emptiness of 
the moral and spatial "absence" created by Mrs. Gereth's 
strange relations with Things. 
The passion with which Mrs. Gereth endeavors to 
preserve her "high standard," and to enforce her version 
of "staying with things," is perhaps best understood in 
terms of sexuality. As Merleau-Ponty says, in a statement 
that applies to art as well as to philosophy, an explora­
tion of sexual experience is "an opportunity of acquainting 
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oneself with the human lot in its most general aspects 
of autonomy and dependence."*® 
The novel explores the engagement of sexuality in 
the drama over Things as another dimension of aesthetic 
and moral relations. The pairing of characters is either 
caused by or altered by the dispute over Things, There 
is some confusion as to how "close" the characters are 
to each other, and why they are attracted or repulsed by 
one another. For example, Mrs. Gereth is somehow estranged 
from Owen because he has inherited Poynton; Mona calls off 
the marriage when Mrs. Gereth spoliates Poynton; Mrs. 
Gereth spoliates Poynton because of the engagement; Owen 
and Fleda are thrown together by theae accidental occurrences 
rather than through a free expression of love. These are 
the principal instances of how the paradoxical nature of 
sexuality becomes unnatural and negative in all the human 
relations as they are developed in the novel. The natural 
paradox, which Merleau-Ponty calls "one of the contradict­
ions of love," is explained in his words as arising "from 
the metaphysical structure of my body, which is both an 
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object for others and a subject for myself." The para­
digmatic example of subjectivity in conflict with objecti­
vity is Mrs. Gereth, who cannot (or refuses to) see herself 
in relation to others; nor does she see how she is seen 
by others. She becomes like the Things she idolizes. She 
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* 
does not see or feel other people. 
Merleau-Ponty asserts that the "primacy of perception" 
is that it distinguishes human beings from their own 
"thingness." But the reciprocity between people and things 
is also found in that "vision happens among, or is caught 
in, things—in that place where something visible under­
takes to see, becomes visible for itself by virtue of the 
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sight of things." 
Mrs. Gereth is an extreme example of someone who 
is visible to herself only by virtue of the sight of Things, 
"She couldn't leave her own house without the peril of ex­
posure" (p. 12), is symptomatic of the extent to which her 
psycho-sexual being is invested in the spoils of Poynton. 
Her finding herself subjectively in this way complements 
her blindness to how she is seen by others. Concerning 
her strange relations with Owen, for example, we learn how 
she wants to be seen: 
The great wrong Owen had done her was not his 
"taking up" with Mona—that was disgusting, but 
it was a detail, an accidental form; it was his 
failure from the first to understand what it was 
to have a mother at all, to appreciate the beauty 
and sanctity of the character ... One's mother 
... was a subject for poetry, for idolatry. 
(p. 49) 
* She projects human qualities of feeling, seeing, know­
ing, onto the Things, instead of letting them be in their 
own presencing. Nor does she let other people be them­
selves . 
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We then learn that she wants to be "idolized" like 
Madame de Jaume. Perhaps she wants to hold the same 
power over others as her Things hold over her. 
There are other clues in the novel which suggest 
that Mrs. Gereth's machinations of the dispute are related 
to her uneasiness with her own sexuality and with her son's. 
Amongst Mona, Fleda, and herself, the fight over Things 
often looks like a fight over Owen, If this is true, then 
Mrs. Gereth wears the most concealing of masks. Merleau-
Ponty explains: "Sexuality conceals itself from itself 
beneath a mask of generality, and continually tries to es-
22 cape from the tension and drama which it sets up." Fleda, 
of course, is part of that escape; not only is she a pawn 
in Mrs. Gereth's marriage scheme, she also becomes in­
dicted as guilty in the scheme. When all is lost at the 
end, Mrs. Gereth blames Fleda for everything, and betrays 
the very objects of her obsession: "'It was your clever 
sympathy that did it—your beautiful feeling for those 
accursed vanities'" (p. 223). 
It seems that a kind of displacement has occurred in 
Mrs. Gereth's life, which determines her existence in an 
obsessive relation to Things, and excessively worldly things 
at that. Early in the novel Fleda sees "the poor lady's 
strange, almost maniacal disposition to thrust in every­
where the question of 'things,' to read all behavior in the 
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light of some fancied relation to them" (p. 24). Iron­
ically, as I have been arguing, all behavior can be read 
in light of, and in fact necessarily relies upon, Things— 
but it is Mrs. Gereth's "fancied relation" that is the 
problem. Her dependence upon her Things is a pathologi­
cal, not a necessary, relation. She does directly equate 
them with herself more than once, and the narration con­
tributes other indirect evidence: "The mind's eye could 
indeed see Mrs. Gereth only in her thick coloured air; it 
took all the light of her treasures to make her concrete 
and distinct" (p. 146). "Fleda reflected that what she 
'required' was simply every object that surrounded her" 
(p. 46). 
Fleda, by contrast, has a "healthier," although 
socially naive, way of standing in relation to things and 
to other people. Her sense of the autonomy of beautiful 
things is consistent with her unfortunate but wise in­
sistence that Owen be "free" before she will accept him. 
"She couldn't care for such things when they came to her 
in such ways; there was a wrong about them all that turned 
them to ugliness" (p. 78). This passage is symmetrical 
with her refusal of Owen: 
"The great thing is to keep faith. Where's a man 
if he doesn't? If he doesn't he may be so cruel. 
So cruel, so cruel, so cruel!" Fleda repeated. 
"I couldn't have a hand in that, you know; that's 
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my position—that's mine. You offered her 
marriage. It's a tremendous thing for her." 
(p. 197) 
James carefully constructed the sexual relations to 
correspond with the relations to Things; for every pairing 
of characters there is a third presence, always that of 
the Things, and at some point each character reveals, or 
is described in terms of, how they stand in relation to 
the Things—or the spoils—of Poynton. For example, the 
moral difference between Fleda's and Mrs. Gereth's aes-
theticism is developed at some length in Chapter Twelve: 
If Mrs. Gereth's apparent determination to 
hustle her into Owen's arms was accompanied 
with an air of holding her dignity rather cheap, 
this was after all only as a consequence of her 
being held in respect to some other attributes 
rather dear. It was a new version of the old 
story of being kicked upstairs ... Mrs. Gereth's 
passion was keener now and her scruple more ab­
sent ; the prolonged contest made a demand on 
her, and her pugnacity had become one with her 
constant habit of using such weapons as she could 
pick up. She had no imagination about anybody's 
life save on the side she bumped against ... 
Mrs. Gereth had really no perception of anybody's 
nature—had only one question about persons: 
were they clever or stupid? To be clever meant 
to know the "marks." Fleda knew them by direct 
inspiration... The girl now had hours of somber 
hope she might never see anything "good" again: 
that kind of experience was clearly so broken a 
reed, so fallible a source of peace. 
(p. 138) 
The other characters, too, are described in moral and 
aesthetic terms of their standing in relation to "things." 
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Mona, for example, who appears at the beginning of the 
novel only to demonstrate her Philistine vulgarity, is 
characterized thereafter in absentia as "So ugly and 
vulgar, in the light of this squabble" (Owen's words, p.99). 
The only important human "event" of the novel—the marriage 
—is contingent upon where the Things are. 
Fleda's unselfish, unselfconscious appreciation of 
the Things in themselves is what, ironically, causes her 
trouble. The fact that "she thought of them without a 
question of any personal right" (p. 235) is naive and ab­
errant with regard to the whole situation. The betrayal 
of tenderness and affection and the way spiritual values 
are belied by the "gross material ravage" (p. 219) that 
emerges from the world of the novel, are dramatized con­
cisely in the "coincidence" and implications of Fleda's 
love for Things translated to her love for Owen. 
With the shift in scene from Poynton to Ricks, and 
the moving of the Things from Poynton to Ricks, and the 
change of terms from "things" to spoils," there is also a 
shift in Fleda's allegiance—from Mrs. Gereth to Owen— 
and in her feelings towards Owen. The irony with which 
this shift is indicated in the narration is also humorous: 
"She thought of him perpetually and her eyes had come to 
rejoice in his manly magnificence more even than they 
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rejoiced in the royal cabinets of the red saloon" 
(p. 58).* 
The overstating of the fact that people become 
objects of desire for one another is a developmental step 
in the logic of the story. Since Fleda's perception of 
"things" is central to our understanding of the human re­
lations, it is doubly important to follow the transforma­
tion of her aesthetic appreciation to a sexual appreciat­
ion of Owen, and consequently her exiled understanding and 
helplessness in the face of new developments, within and 
outside herself. 
Fleda, mostly subject, becomes an object of desire 
for Owen. "To know she had become to him an object of 
desire gave her wings that she felt herself flutter in the 
air: it was like the rush of a flood into her own accu­
mulations" (p. 105). The conflicting metaphors of flutter­
ing in the air and being flooded not only express the para­
dox of sexuality, but intimate a tension of autonomy and 
dependence that is intensified by the larger scene of the 
ongoing dispute: is Fleda tangentially an object, like the 
things? Owen recognizes Fleda's value in proportion to 
* The "thingness" of Owen is wonderfully indicated in 
an earlier passage describing "his impatience shining 
in his idle eyes as the dining-hour shines in club-
windows" (p. 47). 
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his dependence upon her to get his things back for 
him. * 
Examining the sexual relations in the novel we find 
they are dependent upon aesthetic relations. The artistic 
truth of this correspondence may be justified by the fact 
that, as David Daiches argues, for James "what has aes­
thetic significance possesses moral significance automati-
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cally." This kind of interpretation is encouraged, in 
part, by the mixing of metaphors and suggestive images. 
For example, when Mrs. Gereth contemplates the threat of 
Owen and Mona's marriage and proprietorship of Poynton, 
she thinks in the ambiguous terms of "the horrors they 
would perpetrate in the house" (p, 19). The sportive 
physicality of the pair's relationship and their aesthetic 
£ * 
Philistinism are, to Mrs. Gereth, the same thing. 
More importantly, the sexual/aesthetic ambiguity is 
often carried by the word "thing." When Mona puts her 
"patent-leather foot" down and delays the marriage, Fleda 
has mixed feelings: 
* Owen's ingenuous duplicity is subtle but astounding. 
When the Things are moved to Ricks, he claims "'I never 
knew how much I cared for them1" (pt 88). Then, in the 
final "love" scene with Fleda, he actually tells her, "'I 
never looked at you—not to call looking—till she had 
regularly driven me to it"' (p. 191). 
** It is as Fleda once tells Mrs. Gereth: "'You confound, 
Mrs. Gereth. You mix things up'" (p. 256). 
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She had guessed the truth at Waterbath and 
had suffered from it at Poynton; at Ricks the 
only thing she could do was accept it with the 
dumb exaltation she felt rising. Mona had been 
prompt with her exercise of the member in ques­
tion, for it might be called prompt to do that 
sort of thing before marriage. 
(p. 92) 
The mention of the three major scenes of the novel in 
connection with the sexual pun on "thing" suggests the 
overlapping agency of sexuality with the scene of the 
Things. 
The punning in this regard is subtle until we pay 
closer attention to the frequent appearance of the word 
"thing." Fleda, meeting Owen in London the first time, 
"noticed on this occasion more things in Owen Gereth than 
she had ever noticed before, but what she noticed most was 
that he said no word of his intended" (p, 64). Later, she 
says to him, "'You see, Mr. Owen, how impossible it is 
to talk of such things yet!'" (p. 188). Regarding Mona's 
behavior in the dispute, the pun is extended a bit further, 
as Fleda thinks: "To have loved Owen apparently, and yet 
to have loved him only so much, only to the extent of a 
few tables and chairs, was not a thing she could so much 
as try to grasp" (p. 107). 
The notion of "grasping" is not one associated with 
Fleda's character, aesthetically, sexually, or morally, 
but it is apt with regard to the other characters. Daiches 
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points out that "James was concerned with moral issues 
94 
as they emerged in social behavior.""' The grasping 
social behavior of the other characters can be understood, 
and is in fact presented by the terms of the novel, as 
imperialistic. The factor of imperialism is closely 
interwoven with sexuality, aesthetics, and love, and a 
closer look at this implication will take us deeper into 
the logic of "things." 
Chapter Three 
Love of Imperialism and Love of Beauty 
The extent to which the characters' social and sexual 
behavior is bonded to the objects surrounding them is de­
termined not only by the major scenes and Things at Poyn-
ton, Waterbath and Ricks, but also by the minor scenes and 
minor "things"—at London, in Fleda's father's house, and 
at her sister's house.* Even the insignificant biscuit 
on the floor, when Mrs. Brigstock surprises Owen and Fleda, 
is read as a "sign" of "some scene that the newspapers 
would have characterized as lively" (p, 169). "For Mrs. 
Brigstock there was apparently more in it than met the 
eye." 
There is likewise more than meets the eye in the Things 
as they appear in the novel. It is through them that we 
perceive the imperialism represented and promulgated by 
Mrs. Gereth. The Maltese Cross, for example, which is per­
haps the most pivotal Thing in the novel, essential to the 
denouement, is actually a relic of the Spanish Inquisition, 
obtained under dubious auspices: 
That description, though technically incorrect, 
had always been applied at Poynton to a small 
but marvellous crucifix of ivory, a masterpiece 
of delicacy, of expression and of the great 
Spanish period, the existence and precarious 
* There are too many examples to quote here, but I refer 
the reader to pages 145, 153, 157, 195, 237, 
40 
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accessibility of which she had heard of at Mal­
ta, years before, by an odd and romantic chance 
—a clue followed through mazes of secrecy till 
the treasure was at last unearthed. 
(p. 74) 
The Maltese Cross succinctly symbolizes the mixture of 
imperialism and idolatry. 
Other pieces of the collection which are specified 
historically are of the age of Louis Quinze (p. 22) and 
Louis Seize (p, 104). The Things are referred to as "tro­
phies of her struggles" (p. 71), and in the Preface James 
calls them "the prize of battle" and compares them to Hel­
en of Troy. 
The image, or symbol, of Helen of Troy, is perhaps 
the most important generative equation to be associated 
with the novel. "Helen" implies the ultimate of desire, 
the ultimate object of desire, and the ultimate motivation 
for destruction. We need only think of Marlowe's Doctor 
Faustus; furthermore, it is no accident that the first 
atomic bomb ever exploded, at the Trinity test site, was 
named "Helen." 
Was this the face that launched a thousand ships 
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium? 
Sweet Helen, make me immortal with a kiss. 
Her lips suck forth my soul—see where it flies! 
Come, Helen, come, give me my soul again. 
Here will I dwell, for Heaven is in these lips 
And all is dross that is not Helena.^5 
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The fact that James equates Helen of Troy with the 
Things is an unmistakable allusion to the knot of sexual­
ity, imperialism, and destruction which is tied to Mrs. 
Gereth's character. Kenneth Burke points out that 
Where James has used an image to build up a 
character whose social and moral status is clear­
ly defined in the book, turning things around 
we can interpret this known status as a hier-
archal placement of the image. We thus have the 
bridging device.., that will unite moral and 
social hierachies with the natural and arti­
ficial objects that James treats as their equi­
valents . 26 
James also refers to the dispute as "that 'row,' so 
to call it, between mother and son over their household 
gods" (Preface, p. ix), which flirther extends the Ilium 
allusion, and he claims that he wished the Things to "sug­
gest the gleam of brazen idols and precious metals and in­
serted gems in the tempered light of some arching place of 
worship" (p. xii). Because these equations direct our un­
derstanding of the novel in terms of imperialism—with 
special emphasis on the idolatry of Things—we can't help 
but see Mrs. Gereth as a distorted parody of Aeneas, who 
transferred his household gods from the wreckage of Ilium 
to the foundation of Rome. 
In the text, Mrs. Gereth is said to be "the great 
queen-mother," and "a heroine guarding a treasure" (p. 146). 
"She trod the place like a reigning queen or a proud usurp­
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er" CP- 46). We are told that Mr. and Mrs. Gereth "had 
saved on lots of things in life, and there were lots of 
things they hadn't had at all, but they had had in every 
corner of Europe their swing among the demons of Jews" 
(p. 13), 
Mrs. Gereth is described as "imperious" (pp. 14 and 
221), and "perversely and imperiously sociable" (p. 117). 
The thought of giving Mona the house makes her turn "pale 
as if she had heard of the landing, there on her coast, of 
a foreign army" (p. 116), There are many such similes 
which equate her with imperialism. And we must not forget 
that the Things are equated with "spoils"—the "translated 
spoils" (p, 246). 
Spoils of conquest, apart from the things they are in 
themselves, are objects of idolatrous desire and become 
symbols of domination over other people. Through James's 
metaphors, we are shown that the dispute over a houseful 
of furniture is of the same family as national imperialism. 
Kenneth Burke explains the multi-dimensional power of these 
equations: 
We could not say that his references to "myster­
ies," "household gods," "place of worship," and 
the like are merely opportunistic and negligible. 
Nor should we, on the other hand, treat the ma­
terial "Things" as though he meant them to be 
endowed with true divinity. . . Yet clearly these 
household Things are also Spirits; or they are 
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charismatic vessels of some sort . . . The 
quarrel over heirlooms, desired as a testimony 
of status, attains a higher dimension, as James 
finds in the objects a glow that can place them 
in some realm or order transcending the quarrel 
as such.27 
It is unclear whether Mrs, Gereth has internalized a 
cultural tradition or whether she is the type of individ­
ual who makes collective imperialism possible. What is 
clear is that the specific premise of her ruling passion is 
aesthetic imperialism, from which all the rest follows. 
She tells Fleda at the end: "you'll at any rate be a bit 
of furniture. For that, a little, you know, I've always 
taken you—quite one of my best finds" (p. 245). 
James's focus on the domestic version of idolatrous 
imperialism casts a strange light on the fact that our 
social relations are more grossly material than we like 
to admit (disguising the truth with "high standards"), and 
that moral or immoral acts may be determined by our per­
ceptions of and relations to empirical reality. "Things," 
which are so much more than mere objects, come to be re­
garded as spoils.* 
Mrs. Gereth's character is complicated by the apparent 
validity of her aesthetic taste, which attracts and finally 
victimizes Fleda. The Things themselves serve to hold 
* The rise in property crimes and vandalism in imperial 
societies like ours is a measure of the fact that the in­
crease in having means an increase of wanting and a decrease 
in caring for the things we have. 
45 
Fleda, even though she realizes that Mrs. Gereth is using 
her, "not only with the best conscience in the world but 
with a high brutality of good intentions" (p. 131). Fleda's 
aesthetic sensibility is exploited for Mrs. Gereth's ends, 
and when she falls in love with Owen, that, too, is made 
use of. Mrs. Gereth's delight at discovering Fleda's se­
cret is like "the loud lawful tactless joy of the explorer 
leaping upon the strand." 
She was nothing if not practical: almost the 
only thing she took account of in her young 
friend's soft secret was the excellent use she 
could make of it—a use so much to her taste 
that she refused to feel a hindrance in the qual­
ity of the material. 
(p. 131) 
Beautiful "things" are transformed into tools of oppression, 
and "taste" becomes the appetite for power. Santayana de­
scribes this tendency in terms of "will": 
A want of rationality and measure in the human 
will, that has not learned to prize small better­
ments and finite but real goods, compels it to 
deceive itself about the rewards of life in order 
to secure t h e m . ^ 8  
Mrs. Gereth's "aesthetic" hunger is easily character­
ized as pathological and exploitive, but Fleda's character 
is composed in such a way that we cannot dismiss the love 
of Things as categorically imperialistic. "The museums 
had done something for her, but nature had done more" 
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(p. 23), For Mrs. Gereth, the world is divided into a 
dualism of "gimcracks" and "treasures," and people are 
either Philistines or initiates. But Fleda's sensibility 
isn't "taste," it is the love of Beauty, which is un­
qualified by the "question of any personal right" (p. 235). 
Her poverty of things and lack of avidity is her isolation 
and her freedom from the willfulness of those around her. 
Although she has "the sense of being buried alive, smoth­
ered in the mere expansion of another will" (p. 209), she 
retains more autonomy than the others, without forsaking 
her love of beauty or her moral scruples. In the Preface 
James says, 
the free spirit , always much tormented, and by 
no means always triumphant, is heroic, ironic, 
pathetic, or whatever, and, as exemplified in 
the record of Fleda Vetch, for instance, "suc­
cessful," only through having remained free. 
(p. xv) 
Because of the symmetry of Fleda's aesthetic and moral 
appreciation and vulnerability, it seems that James is 
seeking, through Fleda, for a way to disclose the love of 
beauty as the love of goodness, in a context that requires 
the renunciation of one or the other—which would mean the 
loss of both.* Mrs. Gereth's renunciation of goodness 
A similar dilemma faces Hyacincth in The Princess 
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disqualifies her alleged love of beauty. 
The novel's overlapping, or intersecting, elements 
of aesthetics, sexuality, idolatry and imperialism, are 
the complex constituents of love. Aa Dante saw it, all 
sin is privation or perversion of love—but love it still 
is. The tangible evidence of love and its perversions can 
be found in the things around us, how we perceive them, 
and what we do with them. St. Augustine's maxim was that 
"invisible things are known by the visible things that are 
made." Things are expressive or symbolic of our passions 
and desires; or, they are objects of our needs and desires, 
sometimes for good, sometimes for ill. 
James demonstrates (in much of his fiction, but es­
pecially in The Spoils) that even our domestic "things" 
speak to us and about us. From the humble "tea-things," 
to Owen's "array of arms of aggression and castigation" 
(p. 59), to "the face of the stopped Dutch clock" at 
Maggie's house (p. 239), the world of "things" is the scene 
and the extension of our less material relations and 
passions. 
Casamassima, as he becomes torn between his dual inner 
nature and the outward manifestations of that nature— 
the struggles of the working class and the refined taste 
of the aristocracy. He, like Fleda, cannot renounce 
either without destroying himself, which he does. The 
"integrity" of such a being means it cannot be divided 
and go on living. 
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When Owen and Fleda happen to meet in London (in 
Chapter Six), the awkward, ambiguous scene is conducted 
through the language of things. "He stammered out that 
it was for her he should like to buy something, something 
'ripping,' and that she must give him the pleasure of 
telling him what would best please her" (p. 63). The 
motive behind his "incongruous offers" (p. 64) may be love 
or bribery, and we may wonder as well what it means that 
she finally allows him to buy her a pin-cushion, of all 
things. 
The expressive agency of things is essential to the 
novel's ending; Owen sends Fleda a letter in which he 
offers her a "remembrance" (of what?): "What I want you 
to take from me, and to choose for yourself, is the thing 
in the whole house that's most beautiful and precious" 
(p. 258). The last sentence of his letter, "You won't 
refuse if you'll simply think a little what it must be that 
makes me ask," is mysterious to Fleda, "because it might 
be one of so many things," and she asks herself: 
What did it mean, what did it represent, to 
what did it correspond in his imagination or 
his soul? What was behind it, what was before 
it, what was, in the deepest depth, within it? 
(p. P59) 
Her mode of questioning is that of a critic who 
would make a formal appraisal of a work of art. ("She is, 
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we are told, an impressionist painter.) The terms of her 
questions are the terms of a formal appreciation of life; 
the criteria of meaning, representation and correspond­
ence are used by a person who sees things in their formal 
significance= "Imagination and soul" are the aesthetic 
and moral agencies of art and love, and the spatial terms 
of "before, behind, depth," and "in it," are terms of 
formal composition. And, of course, for James as for 
Fleda, formal composition is the objective structure of 
social and moral composition. 
For Fleda, and perhaps universally, the love of 
Beauty is the love of Form, and form is completeness, in 
which art allows us to participate as a transcendent 
refuge from the formlessness of life. If we regard form, 
technically, as the aesthetic relationships (or arrange­
ments) of entities (shapes, colors, sounds, words, etc.), 
the psychological complement, to paraphrase Kenneth Burke, 
is the arousal and satisfaction of desire on the part of 
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the beholder. Fleda's appeal to life requires this com­
pleteness of form, objectively and affectively, in the 
relations she "almost demonically both sees and feels, 
while the others but feel without seeing" (Preface, p. xv). 
Her penetrating insight into the "poetry" of Things 
is described in aesthetic and spiritual terms. For example, 
at Ricks, the first time, she sees things that Mrs. Gereth 
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cannot. 
The place was crowded with objects of which the 
aggregation somehow made a thinness and the 
futility a grace; things that told her they had 
been gathered as slowly and lovingly as the 
golden flowers of the other house. She too, for 
a home, could have lived with them: they made 
her even wonder if it didn't work more for 
happiness not to have tasted, as she herself 
had done, of knowledge. 
(p. 54) 
In the penultimate chapter, also at Ricks, her vision 
extends to include that which is, "as it were, of something 
sensibly gone" (p. 249). Her vision of the "fourth dimen­
sion" provided by loss or absence, as completing the pic­
ture, is a reversal of that which is repugnant to Mrs. 
Gereth. It is also a felicitous letting-go and letting-be 
of Things without renouncing them. And of course she is 
speaking not only of Things, but of love and life. 
We could say that James has dramatized the love of 
beauty (and its perversion) not "realistically," but pheno-
menologieally—how things appear depends upon the human 
experience and appreciation of them. James shows us the 
how as well as the what. 
Merleau-Ponty, in his essay "The Body in its Sexual 
Being," says: "Let us try to see how a thing or a being 
begins to exist for us through desire or love and we shall 
thereby come to understand better how things and beings 
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can exist in general." The Spoils can be seen as an 
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artistic fulfillment of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical 
intention. To explain the engagement of human conscious­
ness in the objective world is a less difficult task than 
to make that engagement visible. In the novel's logic of 
"things," from household objects to "contested matters of 
pertinence to human existence," James develops a picture 
of the a priori overlapping of the material world and 
consciousness, out of which arise our social, moral, and 
aesthetic modes of being and behavior—in conflict or 
in harmony with the "things amongst which we are." A 
discussion of how he accomplished this feat, and the re­
lation between technique and "things," deserves a chapter 
of its own. 
Chapter Four 
The Restoration of Things 
The editors of James's Notebooks, F,0. Matthiessen 
and Kenneth Murdock, remark in their introduction that 
"The Spoils of Poynton and What Maisie Knew are the works 
that receive the most extensive discussion in his notebooks, 
and they also form the pivotal point between his earlier 
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and later methods." There are two major elements in 
this turning point, both of which initially came together 
in the writing of The Spoils. 
One of these is what we now call his use of point-of-
view—the telling of the story through someone's conscious­
ness. Mattiessen and Murdock comment that, in The Spoils, 
the "drama did not consist in the outer conflict. It had 
32 
become the inner drama of Fleda's consciousness." They 
then refer us to the following passage from the Preface: 
The progress and march of my tale became and 
remained that of her understanding. Absolutely, 
with this, I committed myself to making the 
affirmation and the penetration of it my action 
and my "story;" once more, too, with the re-
entertained perception that a subject so lighted, 
a subject residing in somebody's excited and con­
centrated feeling about something—both the some­
thing and somebody being of course as important 
as possible—has more beauty to give out than 
under any other style of pressure. 
(p. xiii) 
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The "something and somebody" are the Things (among 
other things) and Fleda. There can be no love without 
something to be loved, and there are no objects of love 
without a subject to love them. This may seem a simple 
enough proposition, and one that the artist ordinarily 
assumes (especially in works of "realism"), but it is at 
this fundamental level of structure and meaning that James 
was self-consciously working. He did not assume structure 
for his "fundamental statement;" he allowed it to appear 
$ 
(as in reality it appears) through Fleda's "inner drama." 
The inner drama was one half of his discovery; he had 
not only found the appreciative consciousness through 
which the story would be unfolded, he had also 
arrived, as he said, at "the acquired mastery 
of scenic presentation," and the rest of his 
work would illustrate his conviction that "the 
scenic method is my absolute, my imperative, my 
only salvation." 
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(Matthiessen and Murdock) 
The discovery of the scenic method not only provided 
the world for his subject, it also established the means 
* In a notebook entry he writes that it was from his 
"wasted years ... of theatrical experiment" that he learned 
"exactly some such mastery of fundamental statement—of the 
art and secret of it, of expression, of the sacred mystery 
of structure." (Notebooks, p. 208) 
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for the relationship Kenneth Burke calls the "scene-agent 
ratio." 
Variants of the scene-agent ratio abound in 
typical nineteenth-century thought, so strongly 
given to the study of motives by the dialectic 
pairing of people and things (man and nature, 
agent and scene). The ratio figures charac­
teristically in the idealist's concern with the 
Einklang zwischen Innen- und Aussenwelt.34 
James's position in this idealist tradition is unique, 
however, by virtue of the intensity of the subject's felt 
appreciation of (which is, for James, participation in) 
the scene—the objective architecture of the world. Scene 
a|c 
becomes the agent's apprehension of it. 
James was now able to avoid the detachment of an 
outside account given by an omniscient, disembodied 
narrator. The scenes of The Spoils are united from within, 
by the presence or absence of the Things, and by Fleda's 
understanding of and response to the implications aroused 
by the Things. This is how James, in part, establishes 
the invisible and necessary bond that exists between 
* In the Preface to The Princess Casamassima James is 
adamant on this point: "Experience, as I see it, is our 
apprehension and our measure of what happens to us as 
social creatures—any intelligent report of which has to 
be based on that apprehension ... the affair of the 
painter is not the immediate, it is the reflected field of 
life, the realm not of application, but of appreciation ... 
there is no "interest" for me in what my hero, my heroine 
or any one else does save through that admirable process." 
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"things" and people. Fleda not only sees the agency of 
"things," she also feels—suffers—their implications in 
the other relations around her. The implications, as I 
have shown, are often generated by the transfonnation of 
the word "things," as it bridges or intersects contexts 
of real Things, building a logic that leads to such rami­
fications as "the things there is no patching up" (p. 108). 
The scenes become such an interweaving of agent, 
agency, images and implications that they cannot be separ­
ated. This is why David Daiches claims that "any story by 
James ... would be utterly changed, its meaning would be 
wholly altered, if it were told in any other way," and, 
that the "story" does "not in any real sense exist apart 
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from the technique." 
The diachronic transformation of the word "thing" in 
the novel parallels, on a smaller scale, the word's his­
torical evolution, its expansion and contraction according 
to its various temporal and other contexts. This is es­
pecially pertinent to our concern here because, as 
Heidegger's etymology points out, the word means, among so 
* 
many other things, "that which, is at all." We can thus 
apply one of Fleda's questions to her author: "He might 
* Or, in other words of Heidegger's, "anything whatever 
that is in any way." It is illuminating to follow his nap 
of "res, Ding, cosa, causa, chose, thing" in "The Thing," 
pp. 174-77. 
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mean many things, and what if the many should mean in 
their turn only one?" (p. 157). 
The word has apparently lost much of this existential 
import in our common usage of it, but something of its 
power, its possibility of contextual inherence and elas­
ticity is restored in the novel. James's technique of 
overlapping subjective and objective realities is es­
pecially noticeable in The Spoils because of the phenomeno-
logical appearance of "things" and the questions they 
incite as to their significance, such as: are they Things 
or are they spoils? Does their beauty reside in them, or 
in what they represent, or in the appreciation of them? 
Heidegger's philosophical concern with things is similar 
to James's aesthetic concern: 
When and in what way do things appear as things? 
They do not appear b£ means of human making. 
But neither do they appear without the vigilance 
of mortals. The first step toward such vigil­
ance is the step back from the thinking that 
merely represents—that is, explains—to the 
thinking that responds and recalls.36 
Part of the vigilance of art, to paraphrase Professor 
Robert Johnstone, is in its power to reconstruct context, 
in such a way that things and words are restored to their 
pristine essence, their original power. By making "things" 
an essential part of the scene of the novel, James allows 
them to become the scene—they are empowered to motivate 
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the situations; they stimulate the agents to act. Art, 
in Merleau-Ponty's words, "gives visible existence to 
what profane vision believes to be invisible."37* Our 
necessary relations with the "things" around us are usually 
taken for granted or exploited through ignorance or in­
sensibility. The consequences of such negligence can have, 
as we have seen, dire ramifications in our other relations. 
Merleau-Ponty tells us, "Things are an annex or prolonga­
tion of the body itself; they are incrusted into its flesh, 
they are part of its full definition; the world is made of 
the same stuff as the body."3® 
Henry James, in The Question of Our Speech. says "all 
life ... comes back to the questions of our relations with 
each other." In The Spoils he shows how great a part 
"things" play, objectively, in the intersubjectivity of 
our social relations, which are played out in an objective, 
empirical world, to which we are mainly indifferent, as 
we are to each other. The underlying paradox of the novel 
is that which underlies human existence: we are both 
material and spiritual creatures, angelic or demonic clay; 
our existence is the story of our passional selves struggl­
ing against and towards the materiality of the world, of 
* There is in this statement an Augustinian echo of the 
meaning of love. 
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which we are part. 
As Fleda provides for our understanding of the story 
through her appreciation of the beauty of "things" and 
their importance to human relations, the artists of the 
world make this kind of appreciation possible, and, in 
James's case, visible. 
Along with Fleda's appreciation of the Things is her 
sense of foreboding in response to their translation into 
spoils. She imagines that something objectively terrible 
will happen, to correspond to the more subtle destructive-
ness that pervades the scene of the "amputated" Things. 
The artistic truth of her anxiety prophetically captures 
the modern anxiousness created by what we now call techno­
logical alienation. James, through Fleda, raises the same 
question Heidegger will raise in the Nuclear Age: "What 
is this helpless anxiety still waiting for, if the terrible 
O Q  
has already happened?"0 The terrible, for Heidegger and 
for James, is instantiated aesthetically, in that "every-
gets lumped together into uniform distancelessness ... Is 
not this merging of everything into the distanceless more 
40* unearthly than everything bursting apart?" 
* This is consistent with James's belief in "life being 
all inclusion and confusion, and art being all discrimin­
ation and selection" (Notebooks, p. 138), and his remarks 
in the Preface about "clumsy Life ... at her stupid work" 
(p. vii). 
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The correlation between art and morality is given to 
us in our capacity to find meaning in our relations with 
and amidst empirical reality. Art, in this sense of making 
relations and meanings visible, is profoundly moral. The 
responsibility of the artist is to all things; the artist 
is entrusted with the many faces of the world—beautiful 
or horrible; natural or not. The artist recreates the 
context inhabited by the things that call to him to be 
restored. I think James has accomplished this in The 
Spoils. But then there arises the troublesome question: 
why are the Things destroyed in the end? 
In an early notebook entry, James mentions "the 
horrible, the atrocious conflagration—which may at any 
rate, I think, serve as my working hypothesis for a de­
nouement."4* In the last recorded notebook entry he writes: 
"Little by little, as I press, as I ponder, it seems to 
come to me, the manner of my denouement—it seems to fall 
42 into its proportions and to compose," Both the psycho­
logical and technical aspects of form are addressed in 
these remarks. It is possible to see the apocalyptic 
closing of the drama as the inevitable formal completeness 
required by the story. 
The Things consumed by fire is the novel consuming 
itself. In the train, Fleda resists her "sudden imagina­
tion of a disaster," and, approaching nearer, sees "a 
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brightness that was the colour of the great interior she 
had been haunting. That vision settled before her—in 
the house the house was all ..." (pp. 262-3). Fleda's 
inner drama is consummately merged with external reality. 
The house is gone, the Things are gone, the novel ends. 
Regarded in a wider context of James's work, the 
unease with which the reader is left is not unlike the 
feeling aroused by Christopher Newman's tossing the crucial 
evidence into the fire, at the end of The American; or 
worse, the effect created when Milly Theale's unread last 
words are engulfed by flames at the end of The Wings of 
the Dove. The precious Aspern Papers share a similar fate. 
The agency of fire is thus a recurring motif in James's 
work, but nowhere is it so total as in The Spoils. 
The mystery that surrounds the cause of the conflagra­
tion as well as its effects on the other characters and 
their relations, dramatizes the mysterious power of the 
Things from the beginning. Their noumenal presence through­
out the novel now contributes to our difficulty in inter-
* 
preting their immolation. What are, what were, these 
powerful objects which aroused such passion and drama 
* The absence of a cause for the fire intimates possible 
self-immolation. The best explanation given is that of 
the Shakespearian station-master: '"What has done it is 
this cruel cruel night'" (p. 265). 
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around themselves? If the reader's assumption has been 
that the Things don't really matter to the drama, the 
ending confronts and tests that assumption. Similarly, 
the immutability of the Things was assumed by the charac­
ters in the novel. They have taken for granted the very 
basis of the dispute. The disintegration of the human 
relations has its metaphoric, existential counterpart 
(or consequence) in the dissolution of the Things over 
which they fought and because of which they fell apart 
from one another. The novel thus makes a certain demand 
on the reader: as one has accepted the premises of the 
novel's dramatic development through Fleda, now one is 
forced to accept, with her, the premises of the test with 
which she is confronted. The drama remains "inner." 
To the extent that the fire is an abomination, we 
feel that the world of the novel has ended disastrously 
for Fleda. The Things among which the drama grew are now 
absent, as at the beginning, only finally now. She must 
face the final absence as she faced the one so full of 
potential. The ambivalence associated with the objects— 
beautiful Things of aesthetic value, or spoils of aesthetic 
imperialism and oppression—becomes a further, subjective 
ambivalence in their annhilation, for what has she lost? 
Her response is confounded by her proximity to the disaster 
which beckons to her and repulses her. 
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She heard a far-off windy roar which, in her 
dismay, she took for that of flames a mile 
away, and which, the first instant, acted upon 
her as a wild solicitation. "I must go there." 
She had scarcely spoken before the same omen 
had changed into an appalling check. 
(p. 265) 
The question of renunciation now reenters the drama with 
all the pressure the scene demands: 
... she felt herself give everything up. 
Mixed with the horror, with the kindness of the 
station-master, with the smell of cinders and 
the riot of sound was the raw bitterness of a 
hope that she might never again in life have to 
give up so much at such short notice. 
(p. 266) 
The paradoxical mixing of bitterness, hope, and reluctant 
renunciation, reminds one of some lines in Eliot's 
Four Quartets: 
The only hope, or else despair 
Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre— 
To be redeemed from fire by fire. 
Who then devised the torment? Love. 
Love is the unfamiliar Name 
Behind the hands that wove 
The intolerable shirt of flame 
Which human power cannot remove. 
We only live, only suspire 
Consumed by either fire or fire. 
(Little Gidding, IV)43 
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Perhaps James found it impossible to avoid the heroic 
necessity of Fleda's renunciation of the objects of her 
desire. Hers will be the looking back 
While emotion takes to itself the emotionless 
Years of living among the breakage 
Of what was believed in as the most reliable— 
And therefore the fittest for renunciation. 
(Dry Salvages, II)44 
Although it is Fleda's sensitive apprehension of the 
scene that most concerns us, and thus the renunciation 
which frees her that is most important, we cannot forget 
that one of the implications wrought by the drama amidst 
the Things is that, for others, the Things were not only 
spoils of desire and conquest, but idols of a strange 
worship. 
We have seen that the piety bestowed upon household 
objects is, in the best sense, a humble externalization of 
less tangible feelings of love, affection, and security in 
our dwelling amongst things and people. We have seen how 
in Mrs. Gereth's case that piety grows into disproportion­
ate worship of the objects themselves, which wreaks havoc 
in all other relations and distorts "things" into ugly 
emblems of the appetite for power. The internalization of 
our inability to "stay with things" creates the need for 
the externalization of power, enacted through physical 
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objects used forcibly to alter the scene of all our re­
lations. In this moral context the fire is a terrible 
purgation, necessary, inevitable, like the burning and 
sacking of Troy and then Rome. Fleda's appreciation and 
renunciation render her a helpless spectator of the ob­
jective world's manifestation of power and finitude, 
served out with a monstrous inviolability in opposition 
to which we dare to hope and dream. Perhaps this is what 
James means in the Preface by the "'things' ... exerting 
their ravage without remorse" (p. xv). 
The magnificence of this natural, unnatural ending 
resides in the self-consuming context of the unexpected, 
and strangely necessary ending of all things. The end 
has mixed implications of blessing and curse. What do we 
do with the objects of our desire, and what do they do 
with us? Fleda's fate remains a mystery to ponder. 
It is "in the thick swim of things" that "she saw 
something like the disc of a clock" (p. 266); she re-enters 
the temporal world, and goes "back." So the real ending 
may be a returning. 
Conclusion 
The Spoils of Poynton is a novel about "things," 
and by its own logic it is also about love, which includes 
all things. It is love that implicated Fleda in the drama 
of the Things; when it comes to the crisis of her finally 
possessing one of those Things she is thwarted, "saved" by 
the paradoxical fact that Poynton is not. 
... She heard herself repeat mechanically, yet 
as if asking for the first time: "Poynton's 
gone?" 
The man faltered. "What can you call it, 
miss, if it ain't really saved?" 
(p. 266) 
We are wrong to think it can be a matter of "saving" 
things or people or ourselves from the scenes we have 
ourselves devised and maintained, without reconstructing 
those scenes, which means a reshaping of the world we live 
in. We have made a world in which we cannot live; its un­
reality is revealed in our strange relations with things 
and with each other. 
The transforming power of love, like that of art, can 
recreate the context in which we see and feel things; can 
provide the relations of distance and nearness that more 
appropriately approximate what it means essentially to be 
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human, spiritually and physically in harmony with the 
"things amongst which we are." 
The art of Henry James has this quality of the love 
of beauty as the love of goodness, and he pulls the world 
apart, without harm to the real things and people, that 
we may see it in all its wrongness and possibility as it 
is reconstructed in words that have the power to present 
a living and lived-in context. This is what can be seen 
in following the evolution of the one word "thing." 
"He might mean many things, and what if the many 
should mean in their turn only one?" (p. 157) 
Accordingly Meister Eckhart uses the word 
thing (dine) for God as well as for the soul 
... Thing is here the cautious and abstemious 
name for something that is at all. Thus 
Meister Eckhart says, adopting an expression 
of Dionysius the Aeropagite: ... love is of 
such a nature that it changes man into 
the things he loves. 
* * * 
All manner of thing shall foe well 
By the purification of the motive 
In the ground of our beseeching. 
(Little Gidding, III) 
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